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1.  Introduction 
 
 It has sometimes been argued that the form taken by the initial investment in a foreign 
country may have an important effect on the subsequent growth and development of a foreign 
investor’s manufacturing presence in that county.   This viewpoint is based on three alternative 
and related arguments, all which imply that a joint venture is the best initial form of entry into a 
new and unfamiliar market.  The three arguments, which we will review shortly, are that joint 
ventures provide an efficient way to learn about local conditions (the learning hypothesis), that 
they are a superior way to access resources (the resource access hypothesis), and that they allow 
the foreign investor to exploit his local partner (the exploitation hypothesis).    All imply that 
joint ventures provide a favourable starting point for future market penetration.  They also imply 
that a firm is relatively weak at the initial stage of entry, and thus requires a partner as the only 
way to deal with this weakness.  If these theories are true, we should observe firms which choose 
joint ventures with local partners to make their first entry should subsequently attain larger 
market positions in the target market. 
 But does one size really fit all?    Both the institutional economics and the transactions 
cost literature imply that firms choose a variety of institutional forms, depending on their own 
resource base--and any expected increase in the resources they expect to gain from their foreign 
investment.   Firms will also evaluate the costs of each mode of market entry.  Joint ventures 
pose special management challenges, as the investor must learn to work with a partner, while 
guarding against the possibility of unanticipated imbalance in the distribution of the gains from 
the venture.   The institutional economics and transaction costs approaches make it hard to argue 
that the joint venture form might be the best entry mode for all firms, since the appropriate mode 
of entry (joint venture or wholly-owned subsidiary) will depend on the set of resources at the 
firm’s disposal for this specific foreign entry (including for instance managers familiar with the 
local environment and its social, legal, and economic characteristics) and the availability of 
potential partners willing to share that knowledge.  For example, successful entry into the US 
market for personal computers requires an ability to clone IBM designs. Epson, who had 
 3
challenged the NEC standard for personal computers in Japan, was better able to do so since it 
knew  more about the legal issues involved in cloning, and therefore was less in a need to take an 
American joint venture partner to learn this skill.  
 The two theoretical approaches are thus in clear contrast and call for a test which 
compares, over time, the growth of firms which choose the two alternative modes of entry, joint 
ventures with local partners vs. going it alone with wholly-owned subsidiaries.   This is the intent 
of this paper.  We examine the growth of a set of Japanese firms which have entered the U.S. 
market to see whether those that entered via joint ventures with locals achieved consistently 
faster growth, keeping constant all other factors that might affect that growth.   
 Japanese investment in the United States provides an ideal context to test these opposing 
theories.  First, the two countries have such widely different economic, social, and cultural 
environments that substantial and quick learning must take place if foreign investments is to be 
successful.  Hence, the benefits of joint venturing to learn about local conditions should be high 
in this case.  Second, the evolution of Japanese investment in the United States is very much in 
the news: Japanese investment has increased dramatically in the 1980’s.  By 1994 Japanese 
investors were operating close to 1700 manufacturing plants with more than 400,000 employees 
{JETRO, 1995}.  Perhaps because Japan is the first non-Western country to have such a 
significant investment stake in the United States, Japanese investors have been the subject of 
substantial scrutiny in the U.S. press.   Their own government has also monitored the investment 
through required reports on new investment, so we are able to gather data on more firm specific 
variables than for investors from other countries.  For reasons of both relevance and data 
availability, Japanese investment in the United States offers a good data set to shed light on the 
determinants of the growth of foreign manufacturing presence in an open economy. 
 The paper is organized as follows: the next section reviews the three main theoretical 
arguments that have been used to justify the use of joint ventures as a form of entry.  We then  
outline the hypothesis in more detail.  The third section describes the data and the variables, 
while the fourth presents the results.  The final section provides our interpretation of the results 
and suggests areas for future research. 
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2.  Why choose a joint venture as initial entry in a foreign market? 
2.1 The Learning Hypothesis 
 The internationalization school (Johanson and Vahlne 1977) has argued that firms 
systematically change their form of international involvement as they acquire additional 
information on foreign markets (the establishment chain).  Firms start with exports, and from 
exports they begin to gain an understanding of foreign markets.   They then use that experience 
to start manufacturing in the target market.  However, while their exporting experience may have 
taught them how to sell their products in that target market, they typically do not know how to 
manufacture there. Manufacturing in a foreign market requires knowledge of local factor markets 
and of the institutional, political, and social environment, a knowledge that is accumulated by 
local firms as a by-product of operating there. Hence a joint venture with a local firm is an 
efficient way to acquire this knowledge.  After this knowledge is absorbed, foreign investors are 
able to manage manufacturing operations in the foreign market on their own.  Thus the final 
stage of the establishment chain is a wholly-owned subsidiary.  The internationalization 
approach stresses the importance of the learning which takes place at each stage.   To move too 
quickly to the final wholly-owned subsidiary stage would be beyond the learning capabilities of 
the firm. 
 
2.2 The Resource Access Hypothesis 
 A number of authors (e.g Contractor and Lorange 1988) have argued that firms enter into 
joint ventures to overcome the barriers they face when expanding abroad.  Joint venturing offers 
significant time savings, as it makes it possible to access the complementary assets that the firm 
needs to enter, and that are held by local partners. As these authors state (1988, p.  15): 
   
In general, it is an expensive, difficult, and time consuming business to build up a  global 
organization and a significant international competitive presence.  Joint ventures  offer 
significant time savings in this respect.  Even though one might consider building up one’s 
market position independently, this may simply take too long to be viable.  Even  though 
acquisitions abroad might be another alternative in international expansion, it can  often be hard 
to find good acquisition candidates at realistic price levels-many of the “good deals” may be 
gone.  All of these considerations add to the attractiveness of the joint venture approach. 
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  Foreign direct investors typically enter foreign markets to exploit some type of 
technological advantage, and they typically lack knowledge of  local conditions, access to 
distribution networks, and political connections.  While the foreign direct investor could replicate 
that knowledge, could create its own distribution network, and could build its own reputation 
from scratch in a de novo wholly-owned affiliate, all of these assets are of the public good 
variety, insofar as their replication requires high fixed costs, while the services of assets already 
put in place by the joint venture partner can be obtained at low marginal cost.  Hence a novice 
foreign investor will find it is cheaper and quicker to access these services through a joint 
venture rather than replicate them in a wholly-owned subsidiary. In short, there are good reasons 
why a first entry into an unfamiliar market should take the form of a joint venture, and we would 
expect that firms that choose this form of entry would have a head start over their competitors 
that prefer to go it alone..  
 
2. 3 Exploitation Theories: the Trojan Horse Hypothesis 
 The rapid increase of Japanese investment in the 1980’s, the first major flow of 
investment from a non-Western country, was perhaps responsible for increased emphasis on the 
distribution of gains in joint ventures.   Specifically, a number of authors (e.g. Reich and Mankin 
1986, Hamel 1991 and Pucik 1988b) have argued that the Japanese use their equity joint ventures 
with American firms as Trojan Horses to penetrate the American market.  They accuse Japanese 
joint venture partners of surreptitiously learning the skills contributed to the joint venture by their 
American partners and,  when the learning is complete, of buying out their American partners, or 
of liquidating the venture to go it alone.  This argument is summarized by the title of Reich and 
Mankin’s Harvard Business Review 1986 article, “Joint Ventures with Japan Give Away our 
Future.” 
      Reich and Mankin and other proponents of the “Trojan Horse” hypothesis see joint 
ventures as a vehicle to absorb the skills of one’s partners, with the party that learns the fastest 
and is most efficient at hiding his contributions coming out the winner (Hamel 1991). One could 
wonder why, in American-Japanese joint ventures, it is the Japanese partner that always manages 
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to learn the fastest.  Hamel’s answer is that the Japanese have a greater intent to learn, that they 
are less transparent than their American partners, and that they are more receptive to learning 
than Americans. 
      While this thesis has received considerable exposure through a number of influential 
articles and through the prestigious affiliation of their proponents, no one up to now has 
attempted to check the general validity of this theory.  Hennart, Roehl, and Zietlow (1995) 
looked at the evolution of U.S-Japanese joint ventures to see whether their evolution was 
consistent with the predictions of the proponents of the Trojan Horse hypothesis. 
      Hennart, Roehl, and Zietlow start by developing the implications of the Trojan Horse 
theory.  If the Japanese use joint ventures with American firms as Trojan Horses, what would be 
the evolution of their joint ventures? Hennart, Roehl and Zietlow outline three possible 
scenarios. In the first one, the “expropriate and buy out” strategy, faster learning by Japanese 
joint venture partners allows them to persuade their American partners to sell to them their stake 
in the venture.  Joint ventures are thus transformed into wholly-owned affiliates of the Japanese 
partner. 
      A second scenario is one where the Japanese partners, after having captured the 
contributions of their American counterpart, dissolve the ventures and recreate new wholly-
owned affiliates.  We would then expect the joint venture to be liquidated, and, shortly 
afterwards, a new parallel, but wholly owned Japanese affiliate to be established.. 
     The third scenario is one where the Japanese use the increased bargaining power that 
comes from having captured the knowledge of the U.S. partner in order to exploit the latter 
through the overpricing of the assets transferred to the joint venture. In this scenario, however, 
the Japanese parent falls short of dissolving the partnership and the joint venture then continues 
with an unchanged ownership stake.   
      Hennart, Roehl and Zietlow argue that the first strategy is the most plausible.  One defect 
of the second strategy is that the Japanese must recreate a venture.  Establishing a subsidiary 
takes time (Biggadike 1979) and the time needed is even longer in the case of a foreign 
investment.  The third scenario requires that the Japanese partner be able to gain more from 
overcharging the venture than it loses through the sharing of the losses shouldered by the joint 
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ventures as a result of this exploitation.  In such cases the American partner is not without 
defences, since its equity stake gives it the power to block at least some of the decisions taken by 
its Japanese partner.  It can also reduce its own contribution in retaliation.  A Japanese partner 
overcharging for its sales to the joint venture would also run the risk of being denounced to the 
IRS by its American part-owner. 
      Given these considerations, Hennart, Roehl and Zietlow argue that the Reich/Mankin-
Hamel Trojan Horse hypothesis can be tested by comparing the number of American-Japanese 
joint ventures which have been taken over by their Japanese partner, on one hand, with those in 
which the American partner has taken over the Japanese partner and those which have remained 
unchanged, on the other.  This they name the strong version of the Trojan Horse hypothesis.  The 
weak version assumes that when the joint venture goes bankrupt or is liquidated, it is at the 
instigation of the Japanese partner who then replaces it with a wholly-owned subsidiary.  The 
weak version compares therefore the number of American-Japanese joint ventures which have 
been fully acquired by their Japanese parent and those which have been liquidated and gone 
bankrupt with the number which have been acquired by the American partner and those whose 
ownership shares have remained unchanged. 
      Hennart, Roehl and Zietlow identify the 58 US-Japanese joint ventures that were 
manufacturing in the United States in 1980.  They trace the history of these ventures to 1989. By 
1989, 13 had been fully acquired by their Japanese partners and four had been liquidated.  On the 
other hand, seven ventures had been acquired by their American partners, and 21 had not 
experienced a change in ownership.  Hence, the strong version of the Trojan Horse hypothesis is 
not verified, since there are 13 cases compatible with it, and 28 contradicting it.  The weak 
version is not supported either, with 15 cases supporting it (13 full acquisitions plus 3 
liquidations) and 28 cases that contradict it. 
      One criticism that can be levelled against Hennart, Roehl and Zietlow’s findings is that 
the capture and transfer of the American partner’s knowledge may be compatible, at least for a 
while, with unchanged equity stakes.  The Japanese partner is secretly absorbing the know-how 
of its American partner while planning a parallel, wholly-owned venture.  At some point the 
Japanese partner establishes the new, wholly-owned affiliate, and competes with the old joint 
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venture.  While this scenario is not very plausible, since we would expect the American partner 
to then withdraw from the venture, causing the ventures to be fully acquired by the Japanese 
partner or to go bankrupt, the Hennart/Roehl/Zietlow data set does not allow us to refute it.  One 
could investigate whether the Japanese can maintain the existing venture with the American firm 
while using the knowledge acquired from this partner to develop and strengthen a string of 
existing or new wholly-owned affiliates.  This would, however, require detailed knowledge of 
the relationships between the joint venture partners, knowledge that would be not be likely to be 
shared with outsiders.  The Hennart/Roehl/Zietlow data set thus does not allow us to definitely 
refute the Trojan Horse hypothesis. 
 There is, however, another way to test the exploitation analysis.  If joint venture with an 
American partner provides an opportunity for exploiting the resources contributed by this 
partner, Japanese firms that use joint venture for initial entry would gain resources that would 
allow them to grow faster than their Japanese rivals which, having entered through a wholly-
owned affiliate had to rely on their own resources.  Hence by looking at the correlation between 
initial entry through joint venture and subsequent growth, we are testing the 
Reich/Mankin/Hamel hypothesis that joint venturing with a US firm, because it provides 
opportunities for exploiting the American partner, provides clear benefits for future growth. If 
we observe that the firms with joint ventures with U.S. firms are not able to grow faster than 
their counterparts who choose the wholly-owned subsidiary route to effect their initial entrance 
into the U.S. market, then we cast further doubt on the exploitation theories as well. 
 
2.  Testing the Theories 
 Assume that, as predicted by joint venture advocates, joint venturing with local partners 
is more appropriate for initial entry into the foreign (e.g. U.S.) market.   Then firms which 
choose this form will be able to improve their position in the target market faster than other 
Japanese firms.  This can come from faster learning, better access to complementary resources, 
or exploitation of the local joint venture partner, or from some of each.  Once we control for 
other sources of growth, firms that entered through joint ventures should have a greater presence 
in the U.S. market than other Japanese firms. 
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 The choice of U.S. market entry to test this theory is a good one, since there are no 
significant regulatory barriers which foreign firms need to hurdle.   The foreign investor can 
choose any ownership form it chooses.  Its only barrier is the one which we want to test, namely 
that it has ‘foreignness’ which slows its pace of growth if it fails to take a U.S. joint venture 
partner.  Only firms which choose the wrong initial entry mode will find themselves 
disadvantaged and suffer slower growth.   We thus test the following simple hypothesis: 
 
If joint venturing with local firms is systematically preferable for initial entry, Japanese 
 firms whose first entry into the United States is through a joint venture with an American 
 partner will see their U.S. manufacturing operations grow faster than those Japanese 
 firms  whose first entry is through a wholly-owned subsidiary. 
      
 Because the growth of the US presence by a Japanese investor can be affected by many 
other factors besides joint venturing with locals,  we need to control for all these other 
influences.   
      The first control variable is the general international experience of the Japanese parent.  
Everything else constant, a parent whose products are widely exported abroad is likely to have a 
detailed knowledge of how conditions abroad vary from those in Japan.  Firms that export may 
already have established brand names and distribution channels  in the United States, which they 
can use to take full advantage of newly established manufacturing facilities 
      We would also expect the profitability of the parent in Japan to affect the rate of growth 
of Japanese manufacturing activities in the U.S.  Since foreign operations take some time to 
generate profits, they require substantial up-front investments.  Parents which are not able to 
generate sufficient cash flow may find it difficult to finance such investments, in part because 
such relatively unproved and risky projects are difficult to finance from external sources. 
      A third factor that might impact the growth rate of a Japanese parent’s manufacturing 
presence in the Untied States is the rate of growth of the U.S. industry entered.  Everything else 
constant, it is easier to grow in the U.S .if demand in the industry entered is fast growing as well. 
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3. Data and Methodology 
Methodology and dependent variables 
      To test our hypothesis that entry in joint ventures with a U.S. partner leads to faster 
subsequent growth we used a multiple regression model where the functional relationship 
between the dependent variable (y) and the independent variables (x1, x2,...xp) is expressed in the 
form  
    y = b0  + b1  x1  + b2 x2 + ... bp xp, 
where b0, b1, ...bp, the regression coefficients, are determined from the data.  Table 1 lists all of 
the variables and the predicted signs of their coefficients.  
Dependent variable 
         Our dependent variable is a measure of the size of the American manufacturing 
operations of Japanese parent firms in 1989.  This size is measured in three ways: 
  (1) The total number of employees working for all American subsidiaries of the Japanese 
parent at year end 1989.  We chose not to prorate employment in the case of affiliates partly 
owned by the Japanese parent.  Note that this specification biases our results towards a positive 
and significant coefficient for initial entry through joint ventures. 
       (2) The total number of products (proxied by the total number of 4-digit SIC products 
manufactured by the Japanese parent in the United States; and 
       (3) The total number of subsidiaries in which the Japanese parent held an ownership 
interest at year- end 1989.  
We ran three regressions, one for each of these three measures.   
 As argued above, the aggregate profitability of the Japanese parent’s U.S. subsidiaries is 
not a reliable measure of success or growth, since this measure is greatly affected by the pricing 
of internal transfers, especially those of intangibles, which do not have verifiable market prices.    
  We collected information on growth, our dependent variable, from the population of all 
Japanese firms which had at least a ten percent ownership interest in at least one U.S. 
manufacturing subsidiary as of December 31, 1989.  This list was established from secondary 
sources such as Toyo Keizai and Japan Economic Institute publications, and from information on 
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the Lexis-Nexis news retrieval service.  We also made direct telephone inquiries to both parent 
and subsidiary firms for additional information and clarification. 
 Excluded from the sample are firms that were not publicly traded in Japan in 1989 
(because data needed for some of the independent variables were only available for publicly 
traded firms) and those firms whose first manufacturing entry into the U.S. was after 1985.  Such 
firms were excluded because the firms did not have sufficient time to establish a track record for 
growth, and because proponents of the exploitation or of the learning hypothesis would probably 
agree that these Japanese investors would not have had sufficient time to assimilate the know-
how contributed by their American partners.  We further reduced the population by excluding 
trading companies (whose strategy differs markedly from that of manufacturing firms) and 
parent firms for whom we could not determine the year of first U.S. entry or the ownership 
stakes in their U.S. affiliate.  The number of firms remaining in the study and for which we have 
complete information is 65.   
      The number of 1989 employees of the Japanese investors in our data set ranged  from 7 
to 8,729; the number of products from 1 to 15; and the number of subsidiaries from 1 to 17.  
There were significant differences between Japanese investors in the size of their 1989 U.S. 
manufacturing presence, even within a given industry.  Some firms, such as Matsushita, were 
early entrants (Matsushita's first entry was in 1959) and by 1989 had more than 7,500 employees. 
Matsushita’s rival, Sharp, on the other hand, entered 20 years later and grew much more slowly.  
In 1989, Sharp had just 720 employees.  Even keeping the length of time Japanese firms had 
been in the United States constant, there were clear contrasts between firms.  Both Nichiro 
Corporation (a fisheries firm) and Honda entered in 1979, but ten years later, according to our 
secondary sources, the former had only 50 employees, while the latter had more than 7,200.  
      While our hypothesis suggests that entry through a joint venture with a US firm would 
result in faster growth, there is no theoretical reason to expect a linear relationship.  To the extent 
that growth rates tend to fall as a firm grows due to entropy (Williamson 1975), it may make 
sense to take the logarithm rather than the absolute value of each of our dependent variables. 
Hence LEMP is the logarithm of the total employment of all the American subsidiaries of a 
given Japanese parent; LPROD is the logarithm of the total number of products they manufacture 
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in the U.S.; and LSUB is the logarithm of the total number of their subsidiaries. Taking the 
logarithm of our dependent variables also results in a more normal distribution.  As shown by 
Table 2, these three measures of our dependent variable are highly correlated:  the correlation 
between LPROD and LSUB is .92; that between LPROD and LEMP) is .74; while that between 
LSUB and LEMP is .75.  
Independent and Control variables 
      Table 1 lists our four independent variables and their predicted signs.  JVEN is a dummy 
equal to one if the Japanese parent's first manufacturing affiliate in the U.S. was a joint venture 
with a U.S. firm, and zero otherwise. (3)  Entry was deemed a joint venture if the Japanese 
parent’s equity stake in the subsidiary was between 10 and 90 percent.   
      We expect the number of years (TIME) from the first entry to 1989 to have a positive 
effect on the dependent variables, because the longer the Japanese firm has been in the United 
States, the more opportunity it has had to grow.  The mean value for TIME in our study was 13.8 
years. The extremes were 5 years (the minimum time allowed for inclusion in the study) and 31 
years (Matsushita Electric Corporation).  
      The ratio of export sales to total sales for the Japanese parent in the year of initial entry 
(XRAT) should enter with a positive sign.  XRAT is one measure of the internationalization of 
the firm which has not yet made a commitment to foreign manufacturing.  A more 
internationalized firm at entry may have less need to learn from a joint venture and be a more 
familiar face in financial and labour markets.  Thus it will have less need for a joint venture 
partner in order to undertake a successful growth strategy.  An export-intensive firm may already 
have the brand name recognition and the distribution channels available in the U.S., making a 
quick start more likely. The values for this variable ranged from zero to 66 percent, with a mean 
of 19.94 percent.  
      To measure the profitability (PROFIT) of the Japanese parent, we determined its 
cumulative cash flow from the date of its first entry into the U.S. to 1989.   Cash flow was 
measured as operating income less tax, plus depreciation.  Each annual profit figure was 
translated into 1990 Yen before adding.  When initial entry was prior to 1974, cash flow was 
cumulated from 1974 on (the first year in the Nikkei Database from which these data were 
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obtained). Because we expect high profits to have a decreasing impact on growth, we took the 
logarithm of this variable (LPROF). 
      INGRO measures the growth of the U.S. industry (at the 3 or 4 digit SIC level and over 
the 1976 to 1987 period) corresponding to the main activity of the Japanese parent.  The sign for 
this variable should be positive, as we expect that Japanese firms which are manufacturing in fast 
growing US industries can be expected to grow faster than those in more lethargic U.S. sectors. 
      The correlation matrix (Table 2) shows little co linearity between the independent 
variables.  The highest, .31, is between LPROF and INGRO.  
 
4. Results 
      The results of the regressions are presented in Table 3.  Each of the three models (LEMP, 
LPROD, and LSUB) fit the data well, with R2 values of .53, .42, and .37 respectively.  In all 
three runs JVEN, whether the first entry of the Japanese parent was a joint venture with an 
American firm, is insignificant.  In other words, we found no evidence, for either of our three 
measures of growth, that Japanese firms whose first entry is a joint venture with a US firm grow 
subsequently faster in the United States than those which enter through wholly-owned 
subsidiaries. The implications of the lack of significance of this variable are discussed in the next 
section. 
      While the growth of the Japanese parent in the United States does not seem to depend on 
whether its initial entry was through a joint venture with a U.S. firm, it is explained by two other 
variables, the total cash flow available to the parent (LPROF is significant in all three runs at the 
0.01 level) and the amount of time the parent has been manufacturing in the U.S. (TIME is 
significant in runs 1 and 2 at the 0.05 level).  On the other hand, the rate of growth of the U.S. 
industry entered (INGRO) is insignificant, and so is the parent experience at initial entry into the 
United States (XRAT), as proxied by the parent’s percentage of sales that were exported the year 
it made its first U.S. manufacturing entry. 
 How can we explain the lack of significance of INGRO, the U.S. industry growth 
variable?  This variable has been used successfully in studies of the determinants of Japanese 
foreign direct investment in the United States, both at the industry  (Kogut and Chang 1991) and 
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at the product level (Hennart and Park 1994) levels, and by studies of the choice of mode of 
market entry (Hennart 1991). In our sample, however, the growth in Japanese manufacturing in 
the United States is not correlated with the rate of growth of shipments in the main industry of 
the Japanese parent.  In other words, some Japanese investors have grown slowly in fast-growing 
U.S. sectors, while others have expanded rapidly in an environment of stagnant overall demand.  
Our results suggest that in some slow-growing industries Japanese investors, because of superior 
product or process technology, were able to specialize in fast growing segments, or they stole 
market share from their U.S. rivals.  The overall slow demand growth may be caused by the lack 
of dynamism of American incumbents, or by their leaving the industry, offsetting the rapid 
growth of the Japanese entrants.  Inversely, we find that rapidly increasing sectoral demand has 
not guaranteed Japanese success, as strong American players are responsible for much of this 
growth, leaving little for the Japanese entrants.  Fast food, category- killer retailers, cellular 
phones, and computer software all come to mind.  Hence the real determinant of the growth of  
Japanese investors in the U.S seems to have been their relative competitiveness, as suggested by 
the significance of LPROF, our cash flow variable, a variable that generally proxies for the 
Japanese parents’ innovativeness.   
     The coefficient of the export intensity of the Japanese parent (XRAT) is also 
insignificant. One possible reason for the lack of significance of this variable is that the only data 
at our disposal is not broken down by region.  The foreign market entry skills obtained from 
exporting may not help enter the U.S. market if the firm was primarily exporting to other 
markets.  Likewise, exports would not have been of much use in gaining knowledge of U.S. 
market conditions if they were sold through OEM arrangements.  A better proxy might have led 
to better results. 
 There is another reason why the initial level of exports is not a good predictor of future 
growth in manufacturing presence in the United States.   While internationalization theory posits 
a natural progression from exports to foreign direct investment (the establishment chain), 
transaction costs theory predicts that firms will choose the most efficient mode of serving foreign 
markets and that they will stay with this mode unless there are significant changes in the costs 
and benefits they face.  If scale economies, relative production costs, transportation costs and 
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tariffs, and other factors make it efficient to enter the U.S. market through exports, Japanese 
firms will continue to serve the United States through this mode unless there are major changes 
in the economics of doing so.  Hence it is not surprising that the past level of Japanese exports 
has no impact on the growth of manufacturing investment in the United States. This is confirmed 
by Hennart and Park (1995) who found that the number of years during  which a Japanese firm 
had been serving the American market through exports was not a good predictor of whether or 
not they would start manufacturing there (Hennart and Park 1995).  In other words, firms that 
had been exporting to the U.S. for ten years were no more likely (in fact less likely) to start 
manufacturing there than firms that were new at U.S. exporting.   
 There are also reasons to believe that export levels are unlikely to have a positive impact 
on growth of foreign investments in the United States after the firm has decided to start 
manufacturing there.  Assume that the Japanese parent was using exports to enter the American 
market, but is now forced, through the threat of trade barriers, or the actual imposition of them, 
to switch to manufacture in the United States.  The firm may make a one-time shift to local 
manufacture to maintain the level of product flow into the U.S.  This type of manufacturing site 
decision is defensive in nature, and may not lead to further increases in local production.  If the 
plant is of the ‘screwdriver’ variety, the argument is even stronger.  The intent here is to limit the 
damage to domestic production in Japan, shipping parts to be assembled in the U.S.  For all the 
reasons stated above, a high export intensity may not always proxy for a firm’s commitment to 
overseas manufacture, but may instead signal a firm committed to serving foreign markets with 
exports.  We would not expect such a firm to expand rapidly in the United States.   
 
5. Conclusions and Directions for Future Research 
 Previous work on joint ventures has emphasized the benefits of this entry mode as the 
initial vehicle to enter foreign markets.   Using arguments based on learning, on resource access, 
and on exploitation of the local joint venture partner, a number of authors have argued that joint 
ventures with local firms provide a solid base to grow and prosper in foreign markets.  We tested 
this theory on Japanese manufacturing investments in the United States.  Our results are not 
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consistent with the predictions of the theory.  We find that the initial entry mode chosen by 
Japanese firms has no significant effect on subsequent growth in the American market.. 
 What accounts for this lack of significance?  We think there are two main reasons.  First, 
as argued by both transaction costs and contingency theories, firms choose governance structures 
which are the most efficient, given their capabilities, environmental factors, and partner 
characteristics.  This makes it hard to uncover the general patterns posited in all three theories of 
joint ventures outlined in this paper.  Some Japanese firms are savvier about the American 
environment than others, perhaps because their senior managers have lived in the U.S. for 
extensive periods.  Likewise, not all firms require access to an established distribution network.  
Unless we control for all these factors, we are unlikely to uncover significant effects.   
 Second, these three theories tend to underestimate the cost of implementing strategies of 
learning, resource access, and partner exploitation.  The internationalization theory assumes that 
firms learn from their ongoing operations.  Yet there is plenty of evidence that this learning is not 
automatic.  Jones and Shill (1996, p. 131), for example, argue that American firms “doggedly 
insist on forgetting anything useful learned [through their joint ventures] in Japan.”  The resource 
access theory underplays the significant management costs involved in joint venturing across 
cultural differences.  “Negotiating the joint venture contract is just spring training” is how one 
aerospace executive put it to one of the authors.  Lastly, the exploitation hypothesis assumes that 
American firms do not recognize the potential for leakage of knowledge to the Japanese partner, 
and are not able to take steps to prevent it.  In fact, there is good case study evidence that 
American firms that use joint venture have found highly effective ways to protect their core 
technology from their joint venture partners or to encourage balanced learning within the joint 
venture.  Exploiting the American partner may not be always as easy as Reich/Mankin assume. 
 We should note that we are not denying the attractiveness of joint ventures in some 
situations.  If joint ventures were always an inefficient form with which to structure an initial 
entry into foreign markets, we would have found a negative coefficient in our tests.  Firms with 
initial joint ventures would have grown at a slower rate than their counterparts entering with 
wholly-owned subsidiaries. Firms look for efficient institutional forms for their international 
ventures, and choose a variety of forms depending on the options they are offered, and the 
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resources they bring to or expect to develop from the venture.  Explaining this variety, rather 
than a search for some kind of a universally best entry mode, should be the goal of our research 
in this area. 
 Research on the dynamic patterns of foreign investment is still at its early stages.   We do 
not claim that our analysis gives definitive answers to these questions.  But by questioning the 
conventional theories, we are challenging ourselves and our colleagues to investigate in more 
detail the questions raised in this research.   At least four areas suggest themselves for further 
research. 
 First, we need analyses which can sort out the three types of joint venture benefits 
described above.  We have to admit that some of the impact of joint ventures could have offset 
each other: it is possible that entry through joint venture allows faster growth because it enlists 
the help of the partner, yet also hinders growth because it exposes the foreign investor to the theft 
of its proprietary knowledge by its American partner, thus leading to our insignificant results.  
We should note, however, that our results would still be important, since the assertion of these 
theories is that the joint venture form is per se better, and we have shown that this rather simple 
story does not fit our data set. 
 The issue of an appropriate data set is also an important one for this line of research.  
Finding the necessary data to do this type of research is a daunting task, but we need to search 
for as diverse sets of data as possible, covering a wide set of environmental changes.   Cross 
national comparisons are a possibility here, as is a longer period of investment experience that 
would provide environmental changes in both the host and home country. 
 A third challenge to this line of research is the tracking of both sides of the relationships.   
It is inevitable that the foreign partner is the more studied, since governments tend to require that 
firms report what they do in foreign markets.   Tracking the U.S. side of these joint venture 
relationships would be a natural extension of our work.  Data sets which provide information on 
both sides of the relationship are an important source of future progress in this literature.      
 Lastly, the bulk of the studies on market entry have looked at the determinants of mode 
of initial entry.  Variables which have logical interpretation as determinants of initial mode of 
entry may not be appropriate to explain subsequent growth. 
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Table 1  
Summary of Variables and Expected Signs 
 
 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION EXPECTED 
SIGN 
Dependent Variables 
LEMP Log of employment in all US subsidiaries of  Japanese parent in 1989         NA 
LPROD Log of number of products of all US subsidiaries of Japanese parent in 
1989    
       NA 
LSUB Log of number of US subsidiaries of Japanese parent in 1989         NA 
Independent Variable 
JVEN Initial entry was with a U.S. joint venture partner         + 
Control Variables 
TIME Number of years between initial entry and 1989         + 
LPROF Log of cumulative parent cash flow from initial entry through 1989         + 
INGRO Growth rate of US industry entered, 1976-1987         + 
XRAT Parent’s ratio of export sales to total sales in year of initial entry         + 
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Table 2 
Correlation Matrix 
 
 
LPROD 0.7429 1 
      
LSUB 0.7454 0.9208 1 
     
JVEN 0.0001 0.0367 0.1237 1 
    
TIME 0.3411 0.3422 0.2673 0.1876 1 
   
LPROF 0.7135 0.6508 0.6338 0.0763 0.2278 1 
  
INGRO 0.1436 0.18 0.1473 -0.0979 -0.084 0.3079 1 
 
XRAT 0.2311 0.1664 0.1007 -0.1794 -0.1225 0.2098 -0.0517 1 
 
LEMP LPROD LSUB JVEN TIME LPROF INGRO XRAT 
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Table 3 
Determinants of the Growth of a Japanese Firm’s Manufacturing Presence in the U.S. 
 
Table 3A    Dependent Variable = Log of number of employees (LEMP) 
 
Variable Name Description Coefficients t-statistics  
Intercept 
 
-3.34516 -2.988 *** 
JVEN 
Initial entry is joint venture with U.S. firm 
-0.25927 -0.853 
TIME 
Years from initial entry to 1989 
0.064583 2.311  ** 
LPROF 
log of cumulative cash flow from initial entry to 1989 
0.734682 6.724 *** 
INGRO 
Growth rate of US industry entered, 1976-1987 
-0.01757 -0.479 
XRAT 
Parent’s ratio of export sales to total sales for parent  
0.009629 -1.104 
 
Adjusted R2  = 0.52604             F  = 15.20656         N = 65                  *** = p<0.01     ** = p<0.05   (one-tailed) 
 
 
Table 3B    Dependent Variable = Log of Product Count (LPROD) 
 
Variable Name Description Coefficients t-statistics  
Intercept 
 
-3.52055 -5.566 *** 
JVEN 
Initial entry is joint venture with U.S. firm 
-0.06297 -0.367 
TIME 
Years from initial entry to 1989 
0.035154 2.227   ** 
LPROF 
log of cumulative cash flow from initial entry to 1989 
0.330469 5.354  *** 
INGRO 
Growth rate of US industry entered, 1976-1987 
0.00395 0.191 
XRAT 
Parent’s ratio of export sales to total sales for parent  
0.003217 0.653 
Adjusted R2 = .42452               F = 10.44218          N = 65                   *** = p<0.01     ** = p<0.05   (one-tailed) 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Determinants of the Growth of a Japanese Firm’s Manufacturing Presence in the U.S. 
 
 
Table 3C   Dependent Variable = Log of Number of Subsidiaries (LSUB) 
 
 
Variable Name Description Coefficients t-statistics  
Intercept 
 
-3.39295 -5.058 *** 
JVEN 
Initial entry is joint venture with U.S. firm 
0.090905 0.499 
TIME 
Years from initial entry to 1989 
0.01813 -1.083 
LPROF 
log of cumulative cash flow from initial entry to 1989 
0.353682 5.403 *** 
INGRO 
Growth rate of US industry entered, 1976-1987 
-0.00553 0.802 
XRAT 
Parent’s ratio of export sales to total sales   
-2.97E-04 -0.057 
Adjusted R2 = 0.37222             F = 8.58927            N=65                      *** = p<0.01     ** = p<0.05   (one-tailed) 
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